I. INTRODUCTION
On 26 January 2009, Nadya Suleman gave birth to eight children. The 1 public outpouring of support quickly turned into widespread condemnation as more information about Ms. Suleman's multiple pregnancies and financial situation was released. Once the public learned not only that Ms. Suleman 2 had six other children but also that all fourteen children had been conceived using in vitro fertilization, the public began to question both her judgment and the judgment of her doctor. The public apparently was willing to accept the 3 birth if it was the non-deliberate product of a hormone-based fertility treatment but was less willing to accept the birth if it was the result of a deliberate choice on the part of Ms. Suleman and her physician.
Recent media attention on the Suleman Octuplets, "John and Kate Plus 8," and other similarly situated high order births (those in which a mother gives birth to triplets or more) has created the impression that high order births are increasingly common. In response, the mainstream media transformed a few high profile instances of high order births into an epidemic and has
The state and federal governments could take a number of possible statutory routes. The government could mandate selective reductions when multiple pregnancies result, eliminate or restrict access to hormone-based treatments, codify the existing medical guidelines, or take a more dramatic route: change existing insurance law to favor those treatments least likely to result in multiple pregnancies. Each of these options implicates significant constitutional concerns.
In setting into statutory stone the choices available to a woman and her doctor, the states may violate federal reproductive and substantive due process law. Reproduction has long been held a fundamental interest, interference with which will trigger the Equal Protection Clause's strict scrutiny test. 6 Since the days of Skinner, reproduction has become a fundamental right under the Equal Protection Clause although, as will become apparent, this has 7 resulted in a test that turns on undue burdens rather than on strict scrutiny. Although reproduction in the context of fundamental rights traditionally deals with preventing and terminating pregnancies, the logic of termination/prevention is equally applicable to the start of a pregnancy. Both stages of reproduction implicate the same underlying fundamental interest. Both require some medical intervention in order to achieve their ultimate goals. Government interference with either would therefore trigger the same level of scrutiny.
In the modern context, that level of scrutiny is the undue burden test laid out in Planned Parenthood v. Casey Id. at 541 ("When the law lays an unequal hand on those who have committed intrinsically the same quality of offense and sterilizes one and not the other, it has made as invidious a discrimination as if it had selected a particular race or nationality for oppressive treatment.").
likely unconstitutional if they place a substantial and undue burden on a woman seeking pregnancy and that burden was not supported by a substantial and legitimate state interest. Mandated selective terminations would likely fail under this test, as would most restrictions on access to hormone-based therapies. In contrast, codification of existing medical guidelines and changes to existing insurance law would likely survive Casey.
This paper addresses which paths the government may take without violating the constitutional rights of potential parents. These possibilities are addressed from the perspective of a married couple seeking to have a child. The important issues presented by single women/men and by homosexual couples seeking to have children are, unfortunately, beyond the limited scope of this note.
The paper begins by giving an overview of relevant reproductive law. It then discusses various methods of Assisted Reproductive Technology (ARTs) and their side effects. The paper concludes by assessing both the constitutionality of ARTs and four possible government responses aimed at curbing their ill effects: (1) mandated selective terminations; (2) restricting or eliminating access to hormone-based ARTs; (3) codification of the medical communities standards and guidelines; (4) changes in insurance laws.
II. OVERVIEW OF RELEVANT REPRODUCTIVE LAW

A. Development of Reproduction as a Fundamental Interest
Reproductive law developed under the auspices of the Equal Protection Clause as well as under substantive due process. Beginning with 1942's Skinner v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court began to consider the reproductive 10 rights of individuals. Skinner found the sterilization of certain criminals but not others violated the Equal Protection Clause. Oklahoma justified the sterilization on the basis that "habitual criminals" (those who have been convicted of three felonies of moral turpitude) should not be allowed to procreate. The court found that this violated the Equal Protection Clause 11 because the statute sterilized some classes of criminals but not others where the crimes were otherwise punished similarly. 
B. Development of Reproduction as a Fundamental Right
Foundational Cases
Since the days of Skinner, reproductive law has followed a different path. The vast majority of cases now deal with prevention/termination of pregnancies under the auspices of substantive due process. The right to reproduction as a fundamental right is rooted in both substantive due process and in the Equal Protection Clause. Under its modern incarnation, the right 16 to substantive due process rests in the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee that no person shall be deprived of his or her rights without due process of law.
17
In Lochner, the Court found that the right to contract was protected under the Fourteenth Amendment and that this right had been violated. distinguished from Lochner on the basis of the right implicated. In Lochner, only the right to economic liberty was implicated whereas in Meyer and Pierce a much more fundamental interest-the right to rear children-was at stake.
23
Griswold v. Connecticut extended the fundamental right to rear children to the conception of those children. The plurality opinion found that 24 irrespective of the route taken to get there, limiting access to birth control impermissibly intruded into the privacy of the marital bedroom. The majority 25 found that although neither the Constitution nor the Bill of Rights expressly lists a right to privacy, the "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance." [Vol. of the individual to decide core values about family and reproduction. In order to determine the impact of these notions on the question of abortion, the Court extended and applied the Griswold concept of a right to privacy.
36
In Roe, the Court noted that although the state maintains an interest in both potential life and maternal health, at some point the state's interest in maternal health becomes less compelling than its interest in the potential life. 37 Thus, during the First Trimester, a woman may choose to have an abortion because at that point an abortion is safer than pregnancy and the fetus is not viable.
38
However, during the Second Trimester, access to abortion may be restricted as long as the restrictions consider the health of the mother. Once 39 the fetus achieves viability, the state's interest in protecting the life of the fetus becomes compelling enough to warrant restrictions on abortion because there is more than a moral justification under the external harm principal. At 40 that stage, a mother's liberty interests lessen, but the compelling government interest is insufficient to warrant protection of the fetus at the expense of the mother's life. If, under Roe, the "right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, . . . in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy [,] " then that broad right to privacy 42 should also encompass a woman's decision as to what method of assisted reproduction to use when beginning her pregnancy.
Subsequent Reproductive Rights Case Law
In the years since Roe, reproductive rights law has changed in a number of ways. Beginning in 1992 with Planned Parenthood v. Casey and 43 continuing through the ban on partial birth abortions, access to abortions has 44 been curtailed. Irrespective of one's position on the merits of this retreat from unrestricted access to abortions, the fact remains that recent case law has altered the original stance adopted in Roe.
In 1992, Planned Parenthood v. Casey substantially changed the Roe framework but it did not un-ground Roe from a right to privacy. In Casey, [Vol. Similarly, in the case of ARTs, the majority of Americans appear willing to have greater government control in the area. The public is troubled by high-order multiples and by the short-and long-term complications many of these children suffer. However, given the number of Americans who seek to use ARTs each year, the public would likely be unwilling to accept either a ban or severe restrictions on access to selected ARTs.
The Court thus substantially revised Roe v. Wade even as it ostensibly affirmed it. The Court replaced a strict scrutiny test with one based in 'undue burdens.' An undue burden, the Court wrote, was a "substantial obstacle placed in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus."
53
The Court initially avoided an application of the Casey framework to partial birth abortion legislation. In Stenberg v. Carhart, the Court did not 54 find it necessary to apply the Casey framework to the law because the law failed to adequately provide for an exception when the health of the mother is at risk. The Court invalidated the law on that basis without addressing the 55 underlying issue of whether partial birth abortions should be available.
56
Seven years later, the Court could not avoid the confrontation. In applying Casey, the Court in Carhart v. Gonzales significantly retreated from the large fraction analysis. In an opinion replete with references to maternal love and 57 the regret women feel after an intact dilation and excavation (D&E) partial birth abortion, the Court upheld the Federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban in spite of the arguably insufficient exception for preservation of the mother's health. 58 The Court felt that intact D&E is never medically necessary and that basic D&E is always as safe as intact. This decision was reached without a 59 consensus within the medical community concerning whether intact D&E is ever medically necessary. Further, the testimony in favor of the ban generally came from non-experts. By finding that intact D&E is never medically 60 necessary, the Court summarily eliminated those women for whom intact D&E would be medically necessary or preferable from consideration. Thus, there was no large fraction affected by the law, making any assessment under Casey moot. The danger of Gonzales is not its affirmation of a ban on intact D&E. Rather, its danger lies in the justifications for that affirmation and its willingness to assume a paternalistic approach to intimate medical decisions. In assuming that a woman will regret her decision and using this assumption to validate its decision, the Court intrudes on her liberty and right to make decisions about her own life, whether or not she will later have regrets about her decision. The Court's willingness to make and use such assumptions has implications outside of abortion law. In the context of governmental intrusion into assisted reproduction, this willingness implies that the Court would be willing to find that women would regret having high order multiples and that this regret would validate (at least partially) government imposed limits on access to fertility treatments.
III. OVERVIEW OF AVAILABLE FERTILITY TREATMENTS AND ASSOCIATED RISKS
Fertility treatments have been available for nearly as long as abortion has been legal. Like abortions, determining which fertility treatment to use is a very patient-specific decision. Before beginning a course of treatment, the 61 American Society for Assisted Reproduction mandates that couples receive counseling about both the medical treatments available and any possible side effects. During this consultation, a physician discusses the possibility of 62 multiple births and the side effects inherent therein. Pre-term delivery with 63 its associated risks of low birth weight and physical/mental developmental impairments, Cesarean sections, increased risk of pre-eclampsia and gestational diabetes are all discussed. The physician may also go over the 64 financial and emotional burdens inherent in caring for multiple infants/young children, including an increased divorce rates for couples with multiple birth children. The goal of this discussion is for the woman or couple to make an informed decision about the course of treatment. However, "at the end of the 66 day these couples are so desperate to have a baby that they can't even really think about the physical and emotional side effects. So how good is their consent?" Ultimately, desire and bias aside, these women and couples have 67 been made fully aware of the risks they face. They accept the consequences of their actions and choose, under the consultation of their doctors, a course of treatment that works best for them as individuals.
Fertility Treatments Interuterine Insemination
As the name implies, interuterine insemination involves the fertilization of an egg or eggs within the uterus. A woman undergoes one of several 68 hormone therapies to stimulate the maturation of egg follicles. In the United 69 States, doctors typically halt hormone therapy when four egg follicles reach maturity, although in Europe doctors typically halt at three.
70
At this point, either the woman and her partner engage in timed intercourse or the woman is injected with a cleaned sperm sample. A 71 successful pregnancy occurs approximately 15% after a single cycle but increases to 50% after three. If the process creates more than one or two 72 viable embryos, which it does 23-30% of the time, the woman is given the option of selective reduction. Many women opt for the procedure and give 73 birth to either a singleton or twins.
74
Hormone therapy coupled with interuterine insemination is more likely to result in high order multiples than is in vitro fertilization (discussed in greater detail infra). because the process gives them greater control over the outcomes, but interuterine insemination is often a better, or the only viable, option. Some 76 couples may have religious objections to fertilization taking place outside of the mother while others may be faced with significant financial limitations.
77
Financial concerns are often a primary reason for opting for hormone therapy coupled with interuterine injection. Each cycle costs between $200-300 78 without hormones and around $5,000-6,000 with hormone treatment.
79
Although this is high, the figure is far lower than the $9,000+ per cycle cost of in vitro fertilization.
80
In Vitro Fertilization
Interuterine insemination works well for many women but not for all. It is ineffective for women who suffer from tubal blockage or severe tubal damage, ovarian failure (menopause), and advanced stages of endometriosis.
81
It is also ineffective if the male suffers from severe male factor infertility. In 82 these cases, doctors have no option but must resort to in vitro fertilization.
83
In vitro fertilization is similar to inter-uterine insemination in that it begins with giving the mother hormones to stimulate the maturation of egg follicles. The eggs are then harvested from the woman and combined with [Vol. termination is rarely necessary given that few doctors will implant more than one or two embryos per cycle. If interuterine insemination and GIFT both fail to produce a successful pregnancy, a doctor may recommend that a patient try a Zygote Intrafallopian Transfer (ZIFT). ZIFT follows the same procedures as GIFT and traditional 97 in vitro up to the point of fertilization. With ZIFT, the egg is fertilized 98 outside of the woman and then implanted. Unlike traditional in vitro, the embryo is implanted into the fallopian tubes.
99
The success rate for in vitro fertilization is much higher than interuterine insemination. It results in live birth in 22% of cases after three cycles, and as high as 72% after six. However, the increased success rate comes at a high 100 in the path of a couple seeking to have a child. Pretending otherwise is a gross mischaracterization of the issue.
Equal Protection Clause Based Claims
These measures would face similar challenges under the Equal Protection Clause's strict scrutiny test. If the Court follows Skinner because of the 137 factual similarities between that case's sterilization of certain convicts and restricting/eliminating access to certain infertile couples, then the government action must pass a higher standard than the undue burden test laid out in Casey to be valid. 138 Government interest would have to be legitimate and compelling, narrowly tailored, and the least intrusive means available. In the realm of 139 ARTs, the legitimacy of the government interest is questionable because there is insufficient proof that governmental intervention is needed and because the relationship between that interest and the measures implemented in its name would be so extreme as to be irrational. Eliminating or restricting access to hormone-based ARTs in order to reduce the number of children born who suffer long-term health problems incurred as a result of a multiple pregnancy would be analogous to eliminating or restricting access to fast food in order to reduce the number of Americans who suffer long-term health problems incurred as a result of obesity.
Children suffer serious health problems regardless of whether they are born as a result of ARTs. If the government may constitutionally justify eliminating a method of procreation on the basis of possible adverse health effects in some cases where ARTs are used, the government rides a slippery slope toward justifying limiting the ability of couples that may have children with long-term health problems from having children. The justifications for each limitation would be the same-a government concern for the long-term health of children. The difference would be the method of producing those children.
The otherwise compelling nature of the government interest is also weakened by the successful reductions in multiple births (high order or otherwise) the medical community guidelines have accomplished. Given that the incidence of such births (and with them their side-effects) is on the weakened.
The efficacy of those guidelines also calls into question whether restriction/elimination of access to hormone-based ARTs would be narrowly tailored and if such action would be the least restrictive means available. Given the success of the guidelines and that they operate without severely restricting/eliminating access to hormone-based ARTs, government action doing so would be both insufficiently narrow and not the least restrictive means available.
Codification of Medical Community Standards
Codification of existing medical community standards would be sufficiently narrow, and it would pass the rational basis and undue burden tests, but it could only go so far. These guidelines successfully reduced the incidents of multiple births since their inception. Codification of these 141 standards would standardize such progress but would not necessarily capitalize upon it.
Codification of existing standards passes both the undue burden and strict scrutiny tests. If doctors are unwilling to go beyond the guidelines out of a concern derived from professional reputation and medical risks, then a couple seeking ARTs would not be presented with an undue burden on their quest by governmental regulations/statutes limiting their access to those ARTs of which the medical community approves. The couple would be unable to access the therapies with or without the governmental actions. Thus, the government places no additional and no undue burden upon them.
Several states have already codified these provisions but the efficacy of these measures remains uncertain. Further complicating the situation, codification would need to be performed in such a way as to ensure that when the medical community standards evolved, the law could evolve with it. Absent such fluidity, the government runs the risk of creating legal obligations to engage in medical practices that have been discredited.
Changes in Existing Insurance Laws
Codification of these standards would be a good first step but it would only go so far. In order for the government to continue the success of the ASRM guidelines, it must change the existing insurance laws. Physicians and patients alike already prefer the use of in vitro fertilization to hormone-based methods, all other factors being equal. The doctor has greater control over 142 the results of the process and thereby greater control over any possible risks. The patient has a more guaranteed result and is not exposed to the sort of side effects associated with hormone-based ARTs.
Patients and doctors, however, must consider factors other than the best course of treatment. They must also consider the patient's ability to pay. In vitro fertilization is expensive at between $12,000 and $15,000 a cycle. In those states that do mandate its coverage, it is covered only as a last resort. 143 In contrast, hormone-based ARTs may cost as little as $200-$300 a cycle. Changing the incentives for choosing ARTs methods to favor the more expensive but generally less risky in vitro would lead many patients and doctors to choose in vitro first.
In order for any measure to have real efficacy, the statute or regulation must have two prongs. First, the measure would have to mandate coverage of fertility treatments. Without this change, couples lacking coverage and lacking significant amounts of disposable income would turn first to hormone-based ARTs. Second, the measure must mandate that in vitro and its progeny should be covered as a first option and not as a last resort.
The change in coverage does not necessarily entail that all forms of ARTs cost the patient the same amount. The changes simply mean that the out of pocket expenses decrease and in vitro would be given a first option status, which in turn would likely lead to a decrease in the use of hormone-based ARTs. If these two prongs were established, the likelihood of high-order multiples would decrease precipitously. Of the four possible government responses to the risks recreated by multiple pregnancies produced as a result of ARTs examined in this paper, only two can withstand Casey's undue burden test and/or strict scrutiny under an Equal Protection claim. Taken either separately or together, codification of existing medical community standards and changes in insurance laws that favor the use of in vitro fertilization over hormone-based ARTs manage to withstand constitutional challenges and would likely produced the desired results.
